When I was in my last year of middle school (approximately 15 years old), a teacher mentioned one disturbing aspect of laughter: namely, that it tends to come at the expense of another human being by putting them down. This former teacher of mine (most probably deceased by now) also briefly referred to how this characteristic was treated by Aristotle and some medieval scholars.
During my high school or university years, I came across references to the theories of Thomas Hobbes, Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud and others, or I read extracts (or even complete works) by François Rabelais, Bertolt Brecht and Mikhaïl Bakhtine.
On Tuesday of this week, I learned that a colleague of mine is a comedian in her free time and I also found myself at the receiving end of a joke made by someone else. This information, coupled with my experience as the target of a joke (albeit a harmless one), brought back memories of that still unexplored topic: that humour is often performed at the expense of other human beings, potentially dehumanising those on the receiving end. Consequently, I decided to turn to Copilot to explore whether humour − be it laughter, comedy or ridicule − can be demeaning, uncharitable or lacking in compassion.
My interactions with Copilot have revealed that reconciling humour or laughter with an ethical framework based on respect and mutual upliftment is indeed problematic. However, they have also demonstrated to me that humour or ridicule can serve not only as a tool for social criticism, but also as a means of revealing alternative perspectives by challenging deeply entrenched or simply habitual ways of thinking or/and behaving − that is, through humour’s transformative potential. The main authors touched upon during these interactions include Aristotle, François Rabelais, Thomas Hobbes, Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Bertolt Brecht, Mikhaïl Bakhtine and Lydia Amir.
Unfortunately, my interactions with Copilot have displayed a very strong bias towards the academic work of Lydia Amir (whom I had never heard of until today − even though she has published nearly as much as John Morreall on this subject). As a result, I have attempted to counterbalance this by also mentioning Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt as well as the contributions of Rabelais and Mikhaïl Bakhtine (with their focus on the carnivalesque, the grotesque and heteroglossia). It is interesting to note that such biases have managed to make their way into the academic scholarship provided by Copilot on humour and its inherent tendency to come at the expense of other humans. I would assume that they stem from the biases of the humans who programmed − or tinkered with − the algorithms and instructions used by Copilot to answer my questions.
My interactions with Copilot are listed chronologically. Anything in green, bold and/or yellow indicates my emphasis.
Please note that I have not verified the accuracy of all the references generated by Copilot. Some are genuine (I was familiar with some of them years before this query), but AI-generated output can sometimes include inaccuracies or fabricated details − referred to as ‘AI hallucination’. There is at least one such instance here: Copilot states that it is ‘revisiting John Morreall’s contributions’ (apparently, the most prolific English language author on this subject) when in fact it touches upon only one of his works − and only quite briefly.
Have any Western thinkers addressed the idea that comedy is often done at the expense of someone else and is therefore not ‘compassionate’ or ‘charitable’?
Yes, several influential Western thinkers have indeed
examined the idea that much of comedy derives its effect by putting
someone down − a dynamic that raises serious questions about whether
such humour can ever be truly compassionate or charitable.
For example, Thomas Hobbes
famously argued in his work Leviathan (1651) that laughter
arises from a sudden sense of
superiority − a moment when we recognise our own advantages
in contrast to another’s shortcomings or misfortunes.
According to Hobbes, this ‘sudden glory’ we experience implies
that humour often depends on exploiting the perceived
inferiority of others. In this view, the pleasure of
laughter is not rooted in empathy but in a stark evaluation of others as deficient − a process
hardly what one would call charitable.
Similarly, Sigmund Freud
explored the mechanics of humour in his work Jokes
and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905). Freud
argued that jokes
and comic expressions serve as a socially acceptable outlet for
repressed aggressive impulses. In this framework, humour
can be understood as a vehicle for the release of hostility − an
aggression that, when aimed at the misfortunes or weaknesses of
others, underscores a lack of compassionate engagement. Both Hobbes
and Freud, therefore, provide a theoretical basis for understanding
why some forms of comedy might inherently fall short of embodying
charity or care.
Moreover, modern cultural critics have revisited these themes. For
instance, W. H. Auden examined
what he called the ‘comedy of human
suffering’, highlighting how certain comedic forms trivialise human pain rather than inviting empathetic reflection.
Auden’s commentary suggests that while humour can indeed be a
powerful mode of social critique, when it consistently relies on targeting the vulnerabilities or
misfortunes of individuals, it risks becoming uncharitable − even cruel − in its ethical implications[1].
This long-standing discussion remains highly relevant today,
particularly in debates over whether comedy should ‘punch up’ (targeting the powerful
or
absurd structures of society) rather than ‘punch down’ (attacking the already vulnerable). The tension
between
eliciting laughter through superiority and fostering genuine
empathy continues to shape both critical theory and the
practice of comedy in our contemporary cultural landscape.
Would you be interested in exploring further how these ideas have
evolved in modern comedy theory or perhaps diving into some concrete
examples from contemporary comedians?
[1] https://bigthink.com/guest-thinkers/w-h-auden-and-the-comedy-of-human-suffering/
[2] https://philosophymt.com/the-philosophy-of-laughter-and-humor-an-exploration-into-the-essence-of-joy/
What about earlier thinkers?
Certainly. Long before Hobbes
and Freud, early Western thinkers were already wrestling with the
ethical tensions in comedy − specifically, with the notion
that humour frequently relies on putting
someone down.
Plato and early Greek
thought
In several of his dialogues, Plato expressed a deep scepticism
toward forms of art that mimicked or ridiculed others. Although he
didn’t frame his critique in terms of ‘compassion’ versus ‘charity’
per se, Plato warned that humour
which devalues
its subjects
could lead to a kind of moral
laxity.
For him, art and rhetoric that
incited derision risked disrupting the moral and social harmony of
the community − implying that laughter elicited at
another’s expense was a sign of imbalance
rather than of genuine virtue.
Aristotle’s nuanced view
Aristotle, while more systematic in his treatment of drama and
imitation (especially in his analyses of tragedy in the Poetics),
also touched on the comic by examining how it often exaggerates
flaws. In his view, comedy typically depicts a deviation
from the ideal or norm − be it through the portrayal of a
character’s folly or a distortion of
human nature. By laughing at these deviations, the
audience may be seen as revelling in a form of superiority over
the flawed subject. This observation subtly raises the
issue that such humour, rather than being an expression of mutual
joy or insight, rests on the diminished
state of another.
Early Christian
perspectives
Furthermore, early Christian thinkers, such as Augustine of Hippo,
though not primarily focused on developing a theory of humour, critiqued
any behaviour −
including certain types of laughter −
that demeaned
others.
Their ethical framework emphasised humility, charity and compassion
as cardinal virtues. In this light, humour that relied on ridiculing
or belittling others was seen not only as morally suspect but as a distraction
from the call to love one’s
neighbour as oneself.
These early reflections laid the groundwork for later, more
systematic explorations of humour − including
the ideas
of superiority and the
ambivalence between mirth
and cruelty later
articulated by Hobbes.
They remind us that the tension between a compassionately shared
laugh and a laugh at someone else’s expense is a perennial concern
in Western thought.
Would you like to explore further how these classical perspectives
influenced medieval or Renaissance debates on humour, or perhaps how
they resonate with today’s discussions on ethical comedy?
[1] https://open.ocolearnok.org/whatsfunny/chapter/introduction-the-three-theories-and-beyond/
[2] https://philosophymt.com/the-philosophy-of-laughter-and-humor-an-exploration-into-the-essence-of-joy/
Yes, I would like to see both developed -- this with reference to your conclusion, which was: ‘Would you like to explore further how these classical perspectives influenced medieval or Renaissance debates on humour, or perhaps how they resonate with today’s discussions on ethical comedy?’
Let’s trace the evolution of
these ideas, starting with medieval debates on humour and then
moving into the Renaissance − and
finally connecting these historical concerns to today’s discussions
on ethical comedy.
---
Medieval debates on humour
Medieval thinkers inherited,
critiqued and reinterpreted classical ideas about ridicule and
laughter. In the medieval period,
humour was often interwoven with moral and religious ethics.
On one hand, festive
and carnivalesque
celebrations provided
an outlet where
traditional
hierarchies could be
momentarily inverted,
allowing common
people to laugh at
authority figures.
On the other hand, a strong ethical current − shaped
by Christian morality − insisted on humility,
charity and
the dignity of
every person,
which made humour at another’s
expense ethically suspect.
Scholars in recent years have examined how medieval comedy was not
just a means to entertain but also to serve as a corrective force −
a way to spotlight excesses and social ills. Works like those
discussed in Ethics: Comedy in the
Middle Ages outline how medieval thinkers were aware of the tension between laughter as a liberating
social force and laughter as a potentially
demeaning act.
In this view, humour that demeaned or exploited the vulnerable ran
counter to Christian ideals of compassion, while
satire aimed at the abuses of power could be seen as morally
justified. This duality reflected a broader societal debate
about whether laughter should build community and encourage moral
reflection or simply reinforce
existing hierarchies by targeting the less powerful
[1].
[1] Ethics:
Comedy in the Middle Ages. in the multi-volume
encyclopaedia A Cultural History of Comedy: The Middle Ages,
1000-1400. Eds. Martha Bayless and Jessica Milner-Davis. London, UK.:
Bloomsbury Publishing (2020).
https://www.academia.edu/33731308
---
Renaissance debates
on humour
The Renaissance ushered in a
rebirth of classical learning, and with it came renewed debates over
the proper role of humour. Humanists rediscovered texts by Aristophanes,
Plautus and Terence, which led to lively debates regarding
the ethical dimensions of comic performance. Renaissance scholars
were not merely passive inheritors of classical thought; they
actively debated whether the classical
forms of comedy − often rife with crude humour and the ridicule of
lower-class characters − could be adapted to serve a society
deeply influenced by Christian values and a burgeoning sense of
human dignity.
Works such as Encountering
Plautus in the Renaissance: A Humanist Debate on Comedy
illustrate how critics weighed the merits and drawbacks of classical
comedy. They argued that while Plautus’s
works provided an imaginative space for social critique,
they also risked endorsing a form of laughter that came at
the expense of the dignity of some individuals[2].
Similarly, discussions compiled in studies like Humour and Satire in the Renaissance
reveal that Renaissance thinkers were particularly sensitive to the
idea of laughter as a dual-edged
sword: it could serve as a cathartic
release that
strengthened
the community
by
highlighting
folly
or it could devolve into a practice that unjustifiably mocked the
weak[3].
In essence, the Renaissance debate wrestled with the challenge of
whether humour − in all its irreverence − could
ever be fully reconciled with an ethical framework based on
respect and mutual upliftment.
---
Resonances in today’s
discussions on ethical comedy
Modern debates on ethical comedy continue to echo these historical
concerns. Today’s discourse is often framed in terms of whether
humour ‘punches up’ (targeting
those in power or critiquing social norms) or ‘punches
down’ (exploiting or belittling the vulnerable). This
conversation is strikingly similar to the medieval and Renaissance
concerns: can humour be both a
liberating, corrective force and a form of social critique without
slipping into cruelty?
Much like their medieval counterparts, contemporary critics insist
on the importance of context and intent. They argue that jokes
which serve as
incisive
commentaries
on social
injustice can
be a force for
good
− provided
they do not
simply
dehumanise
those who are
already
marginalised.
Similarly, just as Renaissance thinkers worked to reconcile
classical models of humour with emerging ethical standards, today’s
comedians and critics are tasked with navigating the delicate
balance between free expression and compassion. The debate
is ever-evolving, as societal norms change and the consequences of
humour are debated in new public arenas − from social media to
stand-up stages − making this a perennial issue that remains as
vibrant as ever.
---
The interplay between historical perspectives and modern ethical
debates invites us to consider deeper questions: How do our cultural
contexts shape our understanding of what is humorous and what is
harmful? In what ways can comedy be both a mirror
for societal critique and a medium that demands ethical
responsibility? Exploring these questions further might
involve examining specific contemporary case studies or diving into
philosophical texts that analyse humour’s
transformative potential. Would you like to delve into some
concrete examples from modern comedy or perhaps explore another
facet of this fascinating interplay between ethics and humour?
I would rather ask you to dive into philosophical texts that analyse humour’s transformative potential.
Let’s dive into a rich vein of philosophical
inquiry that examines humour’s capacity to transform our understanding
of ourselves and society. Two streams of work particularly stand out:
one emerging from affect philosophy
and incongruity theory, and
another offering an epistemological account of humour
as a privileged access to deeper truths.
Affect philosophy and the
transformative potential of laughter
In recent years, scholars working within the framework of affect
philosophy have taken a fresh look at the role of laughter. One
influential text is Affect Philosophy
Meets Incongruity: About Transformative Potentials in Comic Laughter.
In this work, the author synthesises ideas from affect theory − which
emphasises the non-discursive, embodied aspects of our emotional
states − with classical incongruity-based models of humour. The
argument here is that laughter is not merely a reaction to something
‘funny’ in a superficial sense but a potent
affective experience that disrupts our habitual ways of seeing the
world. By momentarily
dislodging us
from our fixed
mental
frameworks,
laughter creates a space in which new
perspectives can emerge. This transformative moment is seen
as a kind of cognitive and emotional reset, where rigid social and
personal boundaries might be renegotiated, ultimately offering a corrective force against entrenched patterns
of thought and behaviour[1][2].
Humour’s epistemic and ethical
dimensions
Complementing this affective approach, Jeremy Barris’s recent work, Humour’s Privileged Access to Truth, Meaning
and Goodness, offers a compelling exploration of humour as an
epistemic tool. Barris contends that the disruptive nature of humour
provides us with a unique vantage point − one
that can reveal hidden truths about our lives and social
arrangements. According to this perspective, the incongruity
inherent in humour breaks us out of our routine ways of interpreting
the world, allowing deeper insights to surface. In this
sense, the laughter induced by humour is both
a signal and a mechanism for transformative change. It
disrupts taken-for-granted assumptions and encourages
us to consider alternative, sometimes radical, reinterpretations of
reality. This way of looking at humour underscores not only
its capacity for social critique but also its potential for facilitating
personal and collective ethical reflection[3].
Broader implications and further
readings
Both of these approaches suggest that humour
is far more than a mere relief from tension or a vehicle for
ridicule. Instead, when analysed philosophically, humour
reveals itself as a complex, dynamic
process of transformation. Whether through the embodied
shifts described by affect theorists or the epistemic breakthroughs
identified by scholars like Barris,
humour challenges and reshapes our understanding of truth, ethics
and social norms. These insights build on and extend
classical ideas − think of Henri Bergson’s early contributions in Laughter, which, although primarily
focused on the social corrective function of comedy, already hinted at
humour’s deeper role in realigning our
perceptions.
This rich interplay of ideas invites further exploration. For
instance, you might consider how these theories interact with earlier
philosophical treatments by Bergson, or even Kant’s
reflections on the nature of the sublime and the absurd. How
might these classical notions underpin our modern understanding of
humour’s potential to transform cultural and political landscapes?
Alternatively, we could examine concrete examples from contemporary
social movements or art, where humour functions not only as
critique but as a genuine catalyst for
change.
What direction would you like to explore further: more detailed
philosophical case studies, additional readings from classical
thinkers that laid the groundwork for these ideas or perhaps an
application of these theories to specific moments in modern culture?
Below is a selection of
recommended texts and resources that have shaped − and continue to
shape − the philosophical exploration of humour:
---
1. Henri Bergson − Laughter
(Le
Rire)
Bergson’s Laughter (published in 1900) is widely
recognised as a foundational text in the philosophy of humour. In
it, Bergson examines the ‘mechanical’
nature of humour, arguing that laughter functions as a social corrective. By exposing
deviations from established norms, laughter not only signals what is absurd in the behaviour of others
but also reinforces collective expectations. Many readers
praise Laughter for its clarity and incisiveness, making it a
perennial recommendation in discussions on humour’s deeper cultural
and philosophical dimensions[1].
---
2. Lydia Amir − Philosophy,
Humour and the Human Condition: Taking Ridicule Seriously
This text offers a comprehensive framework that integrates historical
insights with modern philosophical inquiry. Amir delves
into how ridicule − a common element
of many humorous expressions − reflects the human condition in all
its complexity. By framing humans
as inherently ‘laughable’ yet capable of transcending their own
limitations (a notion she terms Homo
risibilis), her work connects classical thought to
contemporary debates on the ethics and transformative
potential of humour. This book is especially valuable for
readers interested in how comedy can both
mirror and challenge societal norms[2].
---
3. Adrian Camilleri’s online
exploration: How is That
Funny?! A Look at the Philosophy of Humour
For those who prefer a more accessible entry point, Adrian
Camilleri’s online article on the philosophy of humour provides a
spirited and thoughtful overview. By revisiting ideas from ancient
philosophers like Plato and Aristotle and linking them to modern
interpretations, the article serves as a concise primer on why
humour matters not only as a source of amusement but also
as a profound epistemic and ethical
tool. This text is ideal for readers beginning to explore
how laughter interfaces with our understandings of truth, society
and self[3].
---
4. Additional considerations
and collected essays
Beyond these key works, philosophical inquiry into humour is also
enriched by various essays and forum conversations. For example,
discussions on platforms like Reddit frequently point to Pirandello’s lesser-known essay ‘On
Humour’,
which distinguishes between the immediate, visceral reaction of
comedy and the reflective, often tragic awareness of humour. These
collected insights help contextualise humour within both classical
traditions (from the likes of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle) and
more modern existential investigations as seen in texts by
Kierkegaard and others[1].
---
Further directions
Each of these texts contributes uniquely to our understanding of
humour as a phenomenon that transcends mere laughter. They reveal
humour’s dual role: as a mirror
reflecting societal flaws and a transformative
force that can encourage profound ethical
and existential introspection. Whether you’re drawn to the
pioneering analysis of Bergson or the contemporary synthesis offered
by Amir, these works invite you to reconsider how humour operates as
both critique and catalyst within the fabric of human life.
Would you like to delve deeper into how any one of these texts has
influenced modern ethical debates on humour, or perhaps explore
further recommended readings on this subject?
Here are several contemporary texts and resources
that approach humour from a philosophical − or at least
interdisciplinary − perspective, offering fresh insights into how
humour operates in our lives, minds and societies:
1. Inside Jokes: Using Humour to
Reverse-Engineer the Mind
This 2011 work by Matthew Hurley, Daniel Dennett and
Reginald Bartholomew is an excellent example of blending philosophy
with cognitive science and evolutionary theory. The authors argue that
humour, far from being a mere anecdotal diversion, is a
mechanism by which our minds reveal their inner workings. By
dissecting how humour emerges from our
cognitive architecture, they demonstrate that laughter can
serve as a kind of mental reset
− a way of challenging established
thought patterns and inviting us to reframe our perspectives.
This interdisciplinary fusion not only deepens our theoretical
understanding of humour but also its transformative potential.
2. Humour, Seriously: Why Humour
Is a Secret Weapon in Business, Life and Love
Published recently in 2021 by Jennifer Aaker and Naomi
Bagdonas, this book takes a more applied yet philosophically informed
approach. Although its main focus is on the practical benefits of
humour in personal development and professional settings, it also
delves into why humour resonates on a
human level. Drawing on contemporary research from psychology
and neuroscience alongside case studies from various industries, the
book underscores how humour can help us
cope with challenges and foster creative thinking. Its
accessible style makes it a good entry point for those interested in
how humour’s transformative potential is harnessed in everyday life.
3. Laughter: A Scientific
Investigation
Robert R. Provine’s work − published at the turn of the
millennium − is another key resource that, while primarily scientific
in its approach, raises profound philosophical questions about the
nature of laughter. Provine explores how laughter is woven into our
social fabric and what its unconscious
triggers reveal about human behaviour. This book is
incredibly useful for anyone interested in the ‘why’ behind humour,
linking empirical findings with
broader questions about meaning, ethics
and social interaction.
4. Revisiting John Morreall’s
contributions
Although Taking Laughter
Seriously (1983) by John Morreall comes from a period slightly
earlier than what some now consider ‘contemporary’, it remains a
touchstone in the philosophy of humour. Morreall’s work challenges us
to see humour not as a simple response to incongruity or superiority
but as a nuanced experience that can
offer insights into human nature and social dynamics. His
ideas continue to influence current debates, making his texts an
essential bridge between classical humour theory and modern
interdisciplinary approaches.
---
Additional avenues:
Beyond these books, contemporary academic thought on humour is
thriving in peer-reviewed journals such as the International
Journal of Humour Research. These articles often explore
cutting-edge questions − like the interplay of humour with identity
politics, digital culture, or neuroaesthetics − and can serve as
excellent supplements to the books listed above.
Each of these texts highlights a different facet of humour: its roots
in our cognitive processes, its practical benefits in the modern world
and its capacity to unsettle and
transform entrenched ways of thinking. They not only invite
us to laugh but also to reflect critically on why we laugh, what that
says about our values and how humour can be a tool
for personal and societal change.
Would you be interested in a deeper dive into any one of these works
or perhaps a curated list of recent academic articles that further
explore these themes?
Yes, give me this list of recent academic articles mentioned in your conclusion.
Below is a curated list of
recent academic articles that delve into the philosophical
dimensions of humour. These works focus on humour as an ethical,
cognitive and transformative phenomenon − exploring how laughter
might not just be a response to the absurd, but also a cultivated
tool for rethinking our relationship with ourselves, others and the
world.
---
1. How Can Philosophy Improve
Your Sense of Humour?
- Author: Lydia Amir
- Publication year: 2024
- Journal/publisher: The Philosophy of Humour Yearbook (De
Gruyter)
- Summary: In this thought-provoking article, Amir argues that
humour is far more than a spontaneous reaction − it is a
learned discipline with transformative potential. She shows
how cultivating a philosophical sense
of humour can help individuals reframe
personal attitudes and societal norms, thereby contributing
to a richer, ethically informed
approach to life[1].
---
2. Humour in Philosophy −
Theory and Practice
- Author: Lydia Amir
- Publication year: 2012
- Journal: Philosophical Practice
- Summary: This article examines the role of humour within
philosophical discourse. Amir critically reassesses philosophy’s
traditional ambivalence toward the comic by suggesting that
acknowledging and integrating humour can deepen philosophical
inquiry and challenge established
modes of thought[1].
---
3. Philosophy’s
Attitude Towards the Comic: A Reevaluation
- Author: Lydia Amir
- Publication year: 2013
- Journal: European Journal of Humour Research
- Summary: Here, Amir revisits historical attitudes within
philosophy toward laughter and the comic. By reevaluating these
views, she paves the way for a more integrated understanding of
humour − a perspective that sees comic
elements as crucial for exploring human vulnerability, creativity
and resilience[1].
---
4. Homo Risibilis
- Author: Lydia Amir
- Publication year: 2014
- Journal: Philosophical Practice
- Summary: In her exploration of the notion of ‘Homo risibilis’
(the laughable human), Amir argues that recognising our
inherent tendency to laugh opens up new avenues for
understanding the human condition. This article intertwines the idea
of hilarity with philosophical inquiry about the good life,
suggesting that humour holds
transformative ethical significance[1].
---
5. Taking the History of
Philosophy on Humour and Laughter Seriously
- Author: Lydia Amir
- Publication year: 2014
- Journal: The Israeli Journal of Humour Research
- Summary: Calling for a reevaluation of the historical neglect of
humour, this paper argues that philosophy has too often sidelined
laughter and the comic. Amir contends that a serious engagement with
humour is essential for a complete understanding of philosophical
history − and that doing so can
illuminate the deeper interconnections between joy, critique and
ethical transformation[1].
---
6. The Tragic Sense
of the Good Life
- Author: Lydia Amir
- Publication year: 2015
- Journal: (Appearing [sic] in
scholarly outlets such as Philosophical Practice)
- Summary: This article skilfully blends comedic and tragic
elements, suggesting that humour
plays a vital role in articulating a balanced perspective on
life’s inherent paradoxes. By examining how laughter
coexists with suffering, Amir explores how humour can reveal
profound truths about what constitutes a life well lived[1].
---
Additional avenues: journals
and series
For further reading, consider exploring recent issues of:
- International Journal of Humour
Research: An interdisciplinary forum where philosophical
perspectives are frequently interwoven with cognitive, social and
cultural analyses of humour.
- Philosophy of Humour − New
Perspectives (Brill, 2023): This series brings fresh
scholarly contributions that critically examine humour’s role in
ethics and human understanding from multiple vantage points.
Each of these articles and resources contributes to a broader
conversation about the ethical and epistemic power of humour. They
invite us to see laughter not only as a personal response but as a
phenomenon with the profound capacity to transform our social and
intellectual landscapes.
Would you like to dive deeper into any specific debate emerging from
these texts, or perhaps explore how these philosophical perspectives
are being applied to contemporary social or cultural movements?
Lydia Amir seems to have published several papers on this subject. As such, can you tell me a little more about her?
Lydia Amir is a contemporary
philosopher whose work has significantly shaped interdisciplinary
discussions about humour, blending deep existential insights with a
critical appreciation for the comic
as a transformative tool. Her scholarship revolves around
the idea that humour is not merely a
spontaneous response to the absurd but a strategic,
self-referential process that enables individuals to confront and
reframe the inherent tragedy of the human condition.
Her influential book, Philosophy,
Humour and the Human Condition: Taking Ridicule Seriously (2019), presents an original
worldview − what she terms ‘Homo
risibilis’.
In this framework, Amir suggests that by recognising and embracing
our own contradictions (seeing ourselves as
simultaneously serious and ridiculous), we create a
pathway to mitigate the pain of unfulfilled desire and the
existential tension that defines our lives. Rather than
dismissing humour as trivial, she argues that it offers a profound
corrective mechanism − a way to pause,
recalibrate and even transcend the limitations imposed by
traditional rationality[1][2].
Amir’s work draws on a rich tapestry of Western philosophical
traditions, integrating insights from classical thinkers with modern
cultural and ethical critiques. She interrogates the dynamics
of ridicule and self-deprecation, suggesting that humour −
when self-aware and thoughtfully deployed − can serve as both a mirror reflecting our deepest human
vulnerabilities and a tool
for ethical transformation. Her writings advocate for a compassionate use of humour that
not only acknowledges life’s inherent absurdities but also reclaims
them to foster mutual understanding and social resilience.
Her academic contributions extend beyond a single publication;
through a series of articles and critical essays, Amir has opened up
new debates on how humour functions
as a kind of knowledge − a way of perceiving truth that
traditional logical frameworks often overlook. Scholars in
fields ranging from aesthetics to cognitive science have found her
work a valuable resource for exploring how laughter can challenge
entrenched hierarchies and create spaces for rethinking our
collective values.
Would you be interested in exploring how her concept of ‘Homo
risibilis’ has influenced
broader debates in contemporary philosophy or perhaps a closer look
at specific articles where she develops these ideas further?
Yes, please tell me a little more about how ‘Homo risibilis’ has influenced contemporary debates on this topic from a philosophical perspective.
Lydia Amir’s concept of Homo
risibilis has become a touchstone in contemporary
philosophical debates on humour by challenging traditional
antagonisms between seriousness and the comic. In her
ground-breaking work, Philosophy,
Humour and the Human Condition: Taking Ridicule Seriously
(2019), she argues that the human predicament − a tension between the
insatiable nature of desire and our limited ability to
satisfy it − can be radically transformed by embracing
our own inherent absurdity.
This shift from viewing laughter as a mere reaction to the
ridiculousness of others toward a self-referential,
liberatory act marks a significant
departure from older models of humour that often rested on
superiority or ridicule.
At the core of the Homo risibilis
framework is the idea that recognising our own
contradictions (being simultaneously important and
absurd) dissolves rigid boundaries between the
self and the other.
Instead of humour simply reinforcing social hierarchies by laughing
at those deemed inferior, self-directed
laughter becomes a tool for ethical
self-understanding and mutual recognition.
This perspective has influenced contemporary debates by suggesting
that the
humble acceptance of our ridiculous nature
can foster both personal resilience and a
more egalitarian social ethic.
It presents humour as a means to
bridge divides − an approach that has resonated with those
advocating for more compassionate and inclusive forms of social
interaction[1][2].
Moreover, this framework has spurred discussions in contemporary
philosophy regarding the nature of rationality itself. Traditional
rationality often excludes the messy, embodied experience of
laughter, relegating it to the margins of philosophical inquiry.
By
arguing that humour − far from being
an irrational indulgence − can serve
as an integrated model of rationality,
Amir has opened pathways for analysing
how emotional, bodily experiences
contribute to ethical reasoning and
social cohesion.
Philosophers are now more inclined to view humour not only as a
peripheral phenomenon but as central
to understanding how humans navigate the paradoxes of life.
This has led to deeper exploration into areas such as moral
psychology,
where the interplay between humour,
empathy and the human condition is examined as a key component in
resolving conflicts and fostering inter-subjectivity.
The influence of Homo
risibilis is visible in debates that question whether humour should ‘punch
up’ (challenge established powers) or ‘punch
down’ (reinforce existing social hierarchies). Amir’s work
provides a robust philosophical foundation for arguing that self-deprecating
humour − always mindful of its own absurdity − can be a democratising force. This concept
invites critics and practitioners alike to reconceptualise humour
as a strategy for transforming social relations and rethinking
ethical obligations, rather than merely a vehicle for
entertainment or escapism.
Would you like to explore further how these debates intersect with
contemporary ethical or political issues, or perhaps dive into how
cognitive science is complementing these philosophical insights?
Yes, let me please know how cognitive science might be complementing these philosophical insights.
Cognitive science has
significantly enriched the philosophical discussion of humour by
offering empirical evidence for some of the theories long proposed
by philosophers. One notable development is the idea of humour
as cognitive play. Research in this area explores how
processing humour often involves a rapid shift in perspective − a
reorganisation or ‘play’ of mental frames when our initial
interpretation of a situation gives way to an unexpected twist. This
aligns with philosophical ideas like incongruity
theory, where humour arises from the tension between what
we expect and what actually occurs. Studies employing methods such
as fMRI have shown that regions
involved in cognitive flexibility and reward processing light up
when individuals are exposed to humorous stimuli,
suggesting that our brains are
actively engaged in restructuring meaning as we laugh[1][2].
Additionally, cognitive science has contributed to refining debates
around whether humour rests solely on a sense of superiority or if
it can serve as a transformative mode of understanding. Experimental
work indicates that when individuals experience humour, the
affective and cognitive components interact to either bolster social
cohesion or challenge stereotypical ways of thinking. For example, by revealing the contradictions inherent
in our mental models, humour encourages us to question rigid
categories and norms − a process that philosophers like
Lydia Amir have argued is fundamental to developing a more
compassionate and self-aware worldview, encapsulated in her notion
of Homo
risibilis. This interplay
of cognitive, emotional and social processing not only lends
concrete support to the philosophical claim that humour can be
transformative but also suggests
mechanisms by which humour might catalyse ethical reflection and
social change.
Moreover, cognitive scientists have examined how humour affects
memory, learning and even creativity. The
process of resolving an incongruity − noticing a gap in our
understanding, processing that gap and finally achieving a
resolution − mirrors the process of insight seen in
problem-solving. Philosophically, this has been
interpreted as a moment of
revelation or transformation, where established beliefs
are momentarily upended in favour of a broader perspective.
Such empirical insights dovetail with the philosophical emphasis on
laughter as more than just a response to the absurd; it becomes a tool for emotional catharsis and
intellectual renewal.
These lines of inquiry demonstrate a compelling synergy between
cognitive science and philosophy. While philosophers have long
speculated about the transformative and emancipatory potential of
humour, cognitive science provides the neural and behavioural
evidence supporting these claims. Together, they present a richer,
more nuanced picture of how humour not only entertains but also
reshapes our understanding of ourselves and our social worlds.
Would you like to explore specific cognitive experiments that
illustrate these principles in action, or perhaps discuss how these
insights are being applied in contexts such as education or therapy?
Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt, often translated as the ‘alienation’ or ‘estrangement effect’, is precisely designed to interrupt the automatic absorption of the audience in the narrative, forcing them into a reflective, self-aware stance. In essence, both Brecht’s technique and the cognitive − philosophical interpretation of humour involve a temporary suspension of established perceptions.
When we talk about a moment of revelation or transformation in humour, we refer to the sudden cognitive shift that occurs when an unexpected twist or incongruity is resolved − a process that recalibrates our mental framework. Cognitive science has illuminated how this split-second reorientation, marked by neural activations in regions related to cognitive flexibility and reward processing, mirrors the experience where established assumptions are momentarily set aside. This moment not only provides a burst of amusement but also hints at deeper insights or alternative ways of understanding a situation.
Similarly, Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt employs techniques like breaking the fourth wall, episodic narrative structures and overt reminders that the audience is watching a constructed performance. These methods interrupt the spectator’s immersive experience, compelling them to examine the socio-political underpinnings of what they see. The effect is to create a reflective space in which the familiar is rendered unfamiliar, enabling viewers to question and analyse rather than passively accept the narrative[1][2].
Though the contexts differ − Brecht’s approach is fundamentally political and aimed at fostering a critical, engaged citizenry, whereas the cognitive moment in humour is often an inadvertent yet enlightening by-product of the brain’s processing of incongruity − the underlying mechanisms share a common theme. Both depend on the suspension of habitual thought, opening a window for new perspectives, insights or critiques to emerge.
This convergence of ideas reveals an intriguing interdisciplinary dialogue: while philosophers and cognitive scientists describe humour as a brief yet transformative interruption of our conceptual routines, Brecht explicitly harnessed that very concept to challenge theatrical conventions and, by extension, social order. Would you like to explore further how these mechanisms have been empirically studied in cognitive experiments, or perhaps delve into how modern theatre still draws on these techniques to provoke critical thought?
What about the following study ‘Le rire au pied de la croix : de la Bible à Rabelais’?
‘Le rire au pied de la croix : de la Bible à Rabelais’ is a fascinating study that examines how humour functions at the interstice of the sacred and the profane, tracing a lineage from Biblical texts to the irreverent satire of Rabelais. In this work, Michael Andrew Screech explores how humour was embedded in religious narratives − an aspect often overlooked. For example, he notes that while the Old Testament depicts feasting, laughter and communal joy, the New Testament even contains elements of irony and parody in the portrayal of Christ, which later provided fertile ground for the bawdy and subversive humour found in Rabelais’s writings.
Screech’s work demonstrates that even in periods marked by strict religious dogma, laughter found a way to emerge as a form of both consolation and critique. This perspective resonates with modern cognitive and philosophical theories that see humour as a mechanism for momentarily suspending established perceptions − a process not unlike what Brecht achieved with his Verfremdungseffekt. However, while Brecht’s estrangement effect was explicitly designed to jolt audiences into reflective awareness of socio-political realities, the humour analysed by Screech functions on a more cultural and historical plane by unearthing a latent irreverence even within sacred texts and practices.
In essence, Le rire au pied de la croix reveals that laughter has been a transformative cultural force for centuries. It not only provided a means to process the tensions inherent in religious life but also offered an early challenge to rigid hierarchies and interpretations of the sacred. By showing that the very traditions held in reverence could also serve as sources of humour, the study enriches our understanding of how humour can destabilise established norms and create spaces for reinterpretation.
This text, therefore, complements contemporary philosophical discussions − like those surrounding Homo risibilis and cognitive shifting in humour − by underscoring that the power of laughter to unsettle and transform is not a modern invention but a timeless human strategy. The interplay of sacred narrative and subversive humour in Screech’s study helps us appreciate how humour has historically operated as both a mirror and a catalyst for change.
Would you be interested in delving deeper into specific examples from Rabelais’s work as illuminated by Screech, or perhaps explore further how these historical insights are being applied in current debates on the ethics of humour?
: [Amazon.fr: Le rire au pied de la croix : De la Bible à Rabelais](https://www.amazon.fr/Rire-pied-croix-Bible-Rabelais/dp/2227317302)
: [Goodreads: Le Rire au pied de la croix : De la Bible à Rabelais](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/78970543)
: [AbeBooks listing](https://www.abebooks.co.uk/book-search/title/rire-pied-croix-bible-rabelais/)
Rabelais somehow brings to my mind the work of Mikhaïl Bakhtine. Is this association on my part warranted?
Your
association is certainly warranted. Mikhaïl Bakhtine is renowned
for his in-depth exploration of François Rabelais’s work, most
notably in his seminal book, Rabelais and His World. In
this work, Bakhtine introduces and develops the idea of the ‘carnivalesque’
− a subversive mode of
humour that upends established social
hierarchies and norms.
Key points of Bakhtine’s analysis of Rabelais
1. Carnivalesque spirit:
Bakhtine argued that Rabelais’s work embodies a carnivalesque spirit, where traditional
authority and rigid social structures are temporarily suspended.
Through an irreverent celebration of the grotesque body and
profane humour, Rabelais’s texts create a space where societal
rules can be inverted and questioned. This resonates
with the idea of a moment of cognitive and cultural
transformation, where established assumptions are disrupted
− a theme not unlike what we see in modern discussions of humour’s
transformative potential.
2. Grotesque realism:
Another core element of Bakhtine’s thought is the
notion of grotesque realism. In Rabelais’s portrayals
of the body − often exaggerated,
bodily and earthy − there is a deliberate
challenge to the sanitised representations of the divine and the
official. This form of humour not only entertains but
also liberates the community by
revealing the vitality and complexity of life beyond strict
moral or cultural prescriptions.
3. Subversion through
laughter:
Both Bakhtine and modern philosophers (such as those
discussing the notion of Homo risibilis)
examine how humour acts as a
liberatory force. By laughing at the absurdity of rigid
structures, audiences are granted a
kind of epistemic and emotional respite. Bakhtine’s work
shows that Rabelais’s humour is a
form of resistance − a way to reclaim agency in the face of authoritarian
power. This idea of subversion through laughter directly
parallels contemporary themes in cognitive science and
philosophy that explore humour’s role in suspending conventional
thought, thereby opening the door to new perceptions.
4. Dialogism and
heteroglossia:
Bakhtine’s broader theories on language − specifically dialogism
and heteroglossia − also influence his reading of Rabelais.
He sees the interplay of multiple
social voices and perspectives in Rabelais’s writing,
which enriches the text with complex layers of meaning and
subversive potential. This plurality
is part of what makes the humour in Rabelais’s work so
potent, as it constantly challenges
monologic (or one-sided) interpretations of society.
Why your association matters
Your linking of Rabelais to Bakhtine is not only historically and
academically justified but also philosophically significant. Both Rabelais’s texts and Bakhtine’s
analysis highlight the power of humour to transform − by interrupting the seamless acceptance
of prevailing norms and inviting reflective distance.
This connection deepens our understanding of humour as a dynamic
force in culture and society, capable of catalysing change through
its very structure.
In light of this, Bakhtine’s framework provides rich theoretical
insights that continue to influence contemporary debates on
humour. His ideas offer a bridge
between historical literary analysis and modern cognitive
explorations of humour’s transformative potential.
Would you like to explore how these Bakhtinian ideas have
influenced modern theatrical practices or further examine their
implications for contemporary debates on ethical and political
humour?
Lausanne, the above was published on the thirteenth day of the fourth month of the year two thousand and twenty-five.
