Scott Ritter ‘is
a
former US Marine Corps intelligence officer who served in the Soviet
Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General
Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War and, from 1991-1998, as a UN
weapon inspector’ [Mr Ritter’s own words, as published on RT.com].
Not
only does Mr Ritter write articles for various independent or
non-Western-aligned news outlets (including for Russia Today – https://www.rt.com/search?q=Scott+Ritter)
as well as books, but he also gives interviews (sometimes
several in a week) to various independent news outlets. As he is one of the few voices in the USA to
provide a more balanced analysis of the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
he regularly appears on shows distributed on various online platforms
in the alternative media space.
On 29th September 2022, Scott Ritter interviewed Andrey Gurulyov, whom Scot Ritter described as ‘a Russian military leader, politician and statesman’. On 21st September, in a post published on Telegram (https://t.me/ScottRitter/381), Mr Ritter reacted to Russia’s partial mobilisation announcement as follows (and thus concluded his post):
The mobilization of 300,000 men, as well as the announced goal of bringing all other units up to the standards of the Russian army, will not happen overnight. Russia will be forming new units, and this takes time.
I believe we will see a strategic pause while Russia completes its partial mobilization. This pause will be marked by heavy fighting as Ukraine will seek to disrupt the referendums and alter the geography of the battlefield. But once Russia consolidates the new territory politically, and accrues the necessary military capacity, I believe we are looking at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation as the endgame for this conflict.
I also believe there is nothing NATO can do to alter this reality.
As a preamble to his interview with Andrey Gurulyov, maybe in the hope of getting his guest to reveal information about the Russian strategy, Scott Ritter seems to have left the outcome a little more of an open ended question. Given Mr Putin’s recent speech in which he stated that Russia would use all available weapons at its disposal if forced to, I would think that Mr Ritter’s initial assessment of 21st September is most likely to be correct, especially in the light of what Mr Gurulyov says at 16m54s-17m16s.
but uhm I think everybody can agree that the outcome is a guarantee: that uh Russia is going to grow bigger in the next couple of days and Ukraine is going to become smaller.
This is … this is critical because of a number of things.
It’s not just about the will of the people, it’s about radically transforming the nature of the conflict that’s ongoing between Russia and Ukraine or, as Russian President Vladimir Putin uh has stated, between Russia and the collective West because that’s what’s happening here.
I think uh in previous episodes we’ve discussed uh what I call the game-changing uh nature of NATO intervention into the Ukrainian conflict.
Well, yes, it was a game changer but, by holding these referenda and expanding Russia, transforming these territories into Mother Russia, Russia has changed the game.
It’s no longer going to be a struggle between Ukrainian/NATO forces and Russia and its allies on Ukrainian soil.
Any future combat once these territories are absorbed will be a struggle between foreign powers against Mother Russia and this is a transformative moment.
Uhm how Russia will respond is … is yet to be seen.
But it’s clear that Russia has indicated that uhm any attack on Russia proper will be treated much differently than the special military operation and the constraints that have been placed on Russian military forces to date.
Now, in parallel to the referenda, we had the Russian president order up what’s called a partial mobilisation – that is 300,000 reservists – uhm people with prior military service are being in the process of being mobilised, uh organised into uh combat units uh that will then be sent to the region of conflict uh to reinforce the Russian forces and their allies that are currently engaged in combat against Ukraine and uh whatever NATO mercenaries have been assembled.
Uhm this is … this is a big deal that we ... the Russian government has said that these 300,000 troops are not going to be frontline combatants. Uhm they are going to be used to secure the Russian border and to provide strategic depth uh in the areas that uhm are … are in conflict: Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk and Lugansk.
And in doing so free up the 200 or so thousand uh regular combat forces that Russia currently has uh deployed to the region uhm and whose numbers were frankly speaking insufficient to the task of completing the special military operation, especially given the reality that NATO had ported tens of billions of dollars worth of weaponry and provided training and other assistance to a Ukrainian military that has become little more than a proxy Army of NATO.
But here’s the question: is this going to be enough?
You know, so far, the Russian military has not performed uhm what I would say in … in a manner reflective of its doctrine.
Uh they have operated in fact in a manner which is … which deviates significantly from its doctrine.
Will the provision of these 300,000 troops enable Russia to reorganise itself to uh bring the combat formations that are committed uh to their full status uh and prepare to engage uh this NATO/Ukrainian force uh the way the Russian army has always been trained and equipped to do so?
Uh will a combined arms army or a first guards tank army be allowed to fight the way they’ve trained to fight against a NATO-style enemy or will they continue to uhm to operate in uh in a way that deviates from doctrine and uh so far has failed to produce the kind of dramatic victories that uh one would normally have associated with the employment of Russian troops in these numbers? It’s a fair question.
On 29th September 2022, Scott Ritter interviewed Andrey Gurulyov, whom Scot Ritter described as ‘a Russian military leader, politician and statesman’. On 21st September, in a post published on Telegram (https://t.me/ScottRitter/381), Mr Ritter reacted to Russia’s partial mobilisation announcement as follows (and thus concluded his post):
The mobilization of 300,000 men, as well as the announced goal of bringing all other units up to the standards of the Russian army, will not happen overnight. Russia will be forming new units, and this takes time.
I believe we will see a strategic pause while Russia completes its partial mobilization. This pause will be marked by heavy fighting as Ukraine will seek to disrupt the referendums and alter the geography of the battlefield. But once Russia consolidates the new territory politically, and accrues the necessary military capacity, I believe we are looking at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation as the endgame for this conflict.
I also believe there is nothing NATO can do to alter this reality.
As a preamble to his interview with Andrey Gurulyov, maybe in the hope of getting his guest to reveal information about the Russian strategy, Scott Ritter seems to have left the outcome a little more of an open ended question. Given Mr Putin’s recent speech in which he stated that Russia would use all available weapons at its disposal if forced to, I would think that Mr Ritter’s initial assessment of 21st September is most likely to be correct, especially in the light of what Mr Gurulyov says at 16m54s-17m16s.
TRANSCRIPT
OF MR RITTER’S WORDS FROM 2m04s TO 6m15s
but uhm I think everybody can agree that the outcome is a guarantee: that uh Russia is going to grow bigger in the next couple of days and Ukraine is going to become smaller.
This is … this is critical because of a number of things.
It’s not just about the will of the people, it’s about radically transforming the nature of the conflict that’s ongoing between Russia and Ukraine or, as Russian President Vladimir Putin uh has stated, between Russia and the collective West because that’s what’s happening here.
I think uh in previous episodes we’ve discussed uh what I call the game-changing uh nature of NATO intervention into the Ukrainian conflict.
Well, yes, it was a game changer but, by holding these referenda and expanding Russia, transforming these territories into Mother Russia, Russia has changed the game.
It’s no longer going to be a struggle between Ukrainian/NATO forces and Russia and its allies on Ukrainian soil.
Any future combat once these territories are absorbed will be a struggle between foreign powers against Mother Russia and this is a transformative moment.
Uhm how Russia will respond is … is yet to be seen.
But it’s clear that Russia has indicated that uhm any attack on Russia proper will be treated much differently than the special military operation and the constraints that have been placed on Russian military forces to date.
Now, in parallel to the referenda, we had the Russian president order up what’s called a partial mobilisation – that is 300,000 reservists – uhm people with prior military service are being in the process of being mobilised, uh organised into uh combat units uh that will then be sent to the region of conflict uh to reinforce the Russian forces and their allies that are currently engaged in combat against Ukraine and uh whatever NATO mercenaries have been assembled.
Uhm this is … this is a big deal that we ... the Russian government has said that these 300,000 troops are not going to be frontline combatants. Uhm they are going to be used to secure the Russian border and to provide strategic depth uh in the areas that uhm are … are in conflict: Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk and Lugansk.
And in doing so free up the 200 or so thousand uh regular combat forces that Russia currently has uh deployed to the region uhm and whose numbers were frankly speaking insufficient to the task of completing the special military operation, especially given the reality that NATO had ported tens of billions of dollars worth of weaponry and provided training and other assistance to a Ukrainian military that has become little more than a proxy Army of NATO.
But here’s the question: is this going to be enough?
You know, so far, the Russian military has not performed uhm what I would say in … in a manner reflective of its doctrine.
Uh they have operated in fact in a manner which is … which deviates significantly from its doctrine.
Will the provision of these 300,000 troops enable Russia to reorganise itself to uh bring the combat formations that are committed uh to their full status uh and prepare to engage uh this NATO/Ukrainian force uh the way the Russian army has always been trained and equipped to do so?
Uh will a combined arms army or a first guards tank army be allowed to fight the way they’ve trained to fight against a NATO-style enemy or will they continue to uhm to operate in uh in a way that deviates from doctrine and uh so far has failed to produce the kind of dramatic victories that uh one would normally have associated with the employment of Russian troops in these numbers? It’s a fair question.
[Click on the picture with the
right button of your mouse, then on ‘picture-in-picture’
in the menu and
finally place your cursor on the picture at the bottom of the
screen to display the ‘Play’
icon [i.e. the white arrow pointing towards the right] to start
the clip, which will thus play in ‘picture-in-picture’
mode.
If it does not, click on https://seed305.bitchute.com/hYAwjR83sVSl/6LUFmQBqlmcP.mp4.
Sources:
41:25
Brink of nuclear war / New phase in Ukraine conflict / How will Russia defend liberated regions
Chembuster
First published at 17:15 UTC on 30th September 2022.
https://www.bitchute.com/video/6LUFmQBqlmcP
This show was streamed on YT, at https://youtu.be/OM7Q5ybutB0.
Lausanne, the above was
published on the first day of the tenth
month of the year two thousand and
twenty-two.
