Source: https://youtu.be/Nbj1AR_aAcE
MY TRANSCRIPT (and my emphasis)
Thank you very much, Tom.
Uh it’s a great pleasure to be here.
Uh I wish I was not here virtually but that I was
physically at Cambridge. Uh I’d actually love to come to Cambridge sometime
uh and talk to you and to meet people, go to lunch, go to
dinner and so forth and so on. Uh I understand these virtual talks are a good second best but
they are second best. Uh Tom
asked me to talk for about 20 minutes on the whole subject of the
Ukraine crisis uh which
I of course have written about and talked about extensively since
2014. So I’m happy to do that and I’ll answer questions on
Ukraine. And I’m willing to answer questions on
uh almost any subject uh
you folks would like to talk about.
Uh let me do two things: first let me talk about the origins
uh and the history of this crisis
and uh then talk about
why it’s on the front burner today and then let me say a few words
in conclusion about where we’re headed. Uh
the conventional wisdom in the West – this is certainly true in a
place like Britain and the United States – is that Putin is
responsible for this crisis. ‘It’s
the Russians. Uh
they’re good guys and bad guys. And of course, we are the good guys and
the Russians are the bad guys’.
This
is simply wrong. Uh the United States mainly – but the
United States and its allies – are responsible for this
crisis, not Putin and Russia.
Now why do I say that? It’s very important to understand that what
the West has been trying to do since 2008 is turn Ukraine into
a western bulwark on Russia’s border. And that
policy had three
dimensions to it.
The first and most exp… most important is NATO
expansion. The idea
was that we were going to expand
NATO eastward to include Ukraine. The second
element of the strategy was EU
expansion. So, in other words, it was not just NATO
expansion that was going to go and include Ukraine, it was also EU
expansion. And the third element of the strategy was the colour
revolution –
uh and in
the case of Ukraine that was the Orange revolution. And the
idea was to turn Ukraine into a
liberal democracy like Britain, like the United States.
And not only a liberal democracy but a liberal democracy that was
allied
with the United States. Because again, this
is all part and parcel of a strategy that is designed to make
Ukraine a western bulwark on Russia’s border. Now as I
said to you, the most important
element of the strategy is NATO
expansion – and that’s why the April 2008 Bucharest NATO summit
is of immense importance. At
the end of that April
2008 Bucharest summit, NATO
announced that Georgia and Ukraine would become part of NATO. They said ‘This
is going to happen, period’. The
Russians made it unequivocally clear at that point ‘That
is not going to happen’. They drew a line in the sand. As
you all know, there were two big tranches of NATO
expansion before that 2008 meeting: the
first tranche of NATO expansion was in 1999 – that included Poland,
Hungary and the Czech republic; then there was a second tranche in 2004 which
included countries like Romania
and the Baltic states
and so forth and so on. The Russians swallowed those two NATO
expansions; they intensely disliked both of them, but they
swallowed them. When
NATO said in 2008 that expansion would now include Georgia and
Ukraine, the Russians drew a line in the sand.
It’s very important to understand that: they said ‘This is not happening’.
It
is no accident that in August of 2008, a few months
after April 2008 Bucharest summit, you had a war between Russia and Georgia
– remember Georgia is the other country besides Ukraine that is going
to be brought into NATO; the Russians said ‘That
ain’t happening’, and you had a war in August 2008. In
February, 22nd February to be exact, 22nd February 2014, the
crisis broke out over Ukraine. And it was mainly precipitated
by a coup in Ukraine that overthrew a pro-Russian leader and
installed a pro-American leader – the United States was
involved in that coup. The Russians went
ballistic – this is hardly surprising – they went
ballistic. And they did two things:
first is they took Crimea
from Ukraine. Why did they do that? You
understand that there is a very important naval base called Sevastopol on
Crimea. And there’s
no way the Russians are going to let Sevastopol become a NATO
naval base
– this is not going to happen. That’s
the principal reason that the Russians took Crimea. And
the second thing that they did is that the
Russians took advantage of a
civil war that broke out in eastern Ukraine almost
immediately after the 22nd February 2014 crisis.
And what the
Russians have done is they have fuelled
that civil war, and they
have made sure that their allies were mainly Russian speakers
– and in many cases Russians in eastern Ukraine – are not defeated
by the Ukrainian government. They in effect are wrecking Ukraine. The Russians are basically saying ‘We will wreck Ukraine before we allow Ukraine to become a member of NATO’. So the Russian response –
and it is very important to understand this – in 2014, when the
crisis first broke out into the open in response to what had
happened in Bucharest in 2008, the Russian response was two-fold:
number one they took Crimea – and you should all understand Crimea is gone; it is never going back
to Ukraine – one. And number two: they
have said implicitly
that ‘We will destroy
Ukraine, we will wreck it before we will let it become a
member of NATO’. Now the
question you want to ask yourself is ‘Why
are the Russians doing this?’ This is Realpolitik
101. And the fact that people in the West – especially in places
like Britain and the United States – don’t understand this
boggles my mind, I just don’t understand it – the idea that you
could take a military
alliance run by the United States, the most powerful state in
the world, and run it up to Russia’s borders and the
Russians wouldn’t be bothered by it is simply
unthinkable. We
in the United States have the
Monroe
doctrine. The Monroe doctrine says that no
distant great power is allowed to form a military alliance
with a country in the western hemisphere and is certainly not
allowed to move military forces into the western hemisphere.
I remember the Cuban missile crisis very well.
What happened there is the Soviets put nuclear-tipped missiles in
Cuba. The United States said ‘This
is categorically unacceptable, military forces from afar are not
allowed in the western hemisphere’. And we had the Cuban
missile crisis. And the end result is those missiles were removed.
When
the Soviets were later talking about building a naval base at
Cienfuegos, the United States told them in no
uncertain terms ‘You are not
building a naval base at Cienfuegos, just not going to happen’.
The United
States views the western hemisphere as its backyard and it
prohibits distant great powers from coming into its backyard.
Well, don’t you think the
Russians are going to be deeply disturbed by the United
States turning Ukraine into a bulwark right on its borders?
Of course they are, and the Russians told us that immediately
after the Bucharest summit: the Russians
made it categorically clear, categorically clear, that Ukraine
is not going to become part of NATO. But, of course, the
Americans and their allies did not listen because we
believe
that we’re the good guys, we’re a benign hegemon here in the
United States and we can do pretty much anything we want in the
world. And for a while it looked like we could get away
with that. As I said, the Russians accepted the first NATO expansion – the 1999
one. And they accepted the second NATO expansion. But after
Bucharest, they said ‘This
is not happening’. So you had this major
crisis. It broke out in February 2014. Now the crisis tamped down
quite a bit after 2014. But in the fall … in the fall of last year
2021, it began to ramp up. And of course early
this year – and I’m talking about early 22 – it became a
full-blown crisis. And the question that we want to ask ourselves
is ‘What happened here?’
You know, ‘Why all of a sudden did this crisis go from the back
burner to the front burner?’
And the answer is that the
United States and its allies were effectively turning Ukraine
into a de facto member of NATO. You’ll hear lots of rhetoric
today that the Russians really had nothing to worry about because
nobody is talking about making Ukraine a member of NATO today. And
I think that’s true uh but
if you look at what we were actually doing
uh it’s a different story. First of all, going
back to the Trump administration – and continuing into the
Biden administration –, we are now arming Ukraine;
we were not arming Ukraine during the Obama administration. In
February 2014 when the crisis broke out and in the first few
years after that crisis when the Obama administration was in
power, we refused to arm the Ukrainians because we knew it would
enrage the Russians; it would scare
the Russians. You want to understand that the Russians view Ukraine becoming a part
of NATO as an existential
threat. That’s what’s going on here. The
Russians are sending a very clear message to the West: they’re
telling you ‘We take this threat seriously
and we’re willing to use military force if necessary to eliminate this
threat’. The
Russians are not fooling around here. So what you had
happening in 2021 – and of course it started before that, under the Trump administration – is we were arming the Ukrainians. And when you
start talking about arming the
Ukrainians, those are Ukrainian forces that can fight against
Russia’s allies in eastern Ukraine.
One thing that really spooked the Russians was that the
Turks gave the Ukrainians drones – and drones
have
become a very effective weapon on the battlefield,
as the Azerbaijanis proved against the Armenians last year. And
the Azerbaijanis were using Turkish drones. So the Turks are
giving drones. The
Americans and the British are giving all sorts of other
weapons to the Ukrainians.
You know, of course, that we define
these weapons as defensive weapons, but, of course, as
sophisticated IR [international relations] theorists, you all know
that there’s no such thing as a
meaningful distinction between defensive weapons and offensive
weapons. As we all know from the security dilemma, what looks defensive to us looks offensive
to them. You give drones to
the Ukrainians. Do you think the Russians are going to view
those as defensive weapons? I don’t think so. You
start training the Ukrainian forces the way the British and
the Americans do, you don’t think the Russians are going to
see that as a threat? I can guarantee you they are,
right? So what’s happening here: we’re
arming, we’re training the Ukrainians. And if you look at
how
we’re
dealing with Ukraine diplomatically, we’re basically talking about Ukraine as if
it were an ally or a partner – that’s the kind of
rhetoric we use when we talk about Ukraine. So it looks like diplomatically and militarily the
bonds between the West – especially the United States – and
Ukraine are tightening. At the same time,
we’re doing a number of provocative
things outside of Ukraine that really bother the Russians
enormously. The British
foolishly run a destroyer through Russian territorial waters
in the Black Sea this past summer, June
2021. The Americans take a bomber and they drive it right up
against the Russian coastline in the Black Sea. This
really bothers the Russians, unsurprisingly. So what you see
happening here is the
Russians have a very powerful sense that NATO is moving
eastward, NATO is moving right up to the Russian border, mainly by turning Ukraine
into a de facto
member of the alliance, but also with provocative
measures
like this British destroyer and this American bomber.
The Russians’ … Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, said
[it had] reached the boiling point. They had it, they had it: they’re
not interested really in negotiating anymore; they’re
interested in altering the status
quo and the end result is you’ve had this massive
military build-up, which is doing enormous damage
to the Ukrainian economy, which was already a basket case before
the crisis. So
the Ukraine situation is getting worse and worse and the
Russians have sent a very clear signal to the west that if
they up the ante they – meaning the West – if the West ups the
ante, the Russians will up the ante. And again
Ukraine is not becoming a part of NATO. So that’s where we are
today: we have this major crisis
which goes back really to April 2008 – that’s … that’s the
genesis, that decision to make Ukraine part of NATO. And
then you had the crisis break out 22 February 2014 and, over time,
it was ameliorated somewhat, pushed to the back burner, I think
one could say. And then all of a sudden it broke out again. Now,
is there any hope that we can settle this crisis? I’ll tell you what I think the best solution is ,
I think it’s an obvious solution, but
I think it’s politically unacceptable at this point in time.
The
obvious solution is to turn Ukraine into a neutral state, more
or less a buffer between Russia on one side and NATO on the
other. This is effectively what you had up until
February 2014. Ukraine
got its independence when the Soviet Union broke apart in
December 1991. And from December
1991 until, roughly, early 2014, there was no real problem
with Ukraine. The
United States and its allies were not fighting with the Russians
over Ukraine. There was a verbal dispute going back to
the April 2008 Bucharest summit, but there
was no crisis because
Ukraine from 1991 to 2008 – excuse me to 2013 – was – through 2013 – was
effectively a neutral state, it was a buffer. It
was NATO that changed the situation. You
understand, we now have changed the rhetoric to make
the Russians the bad guys.
You hear all this talk that ‘Russia is bent on creating uh
the second coming of the Soviet Union, uh Russia is bent on
creating a greater Russia; alright, the Russians are the bad
guys.’ this is
a
story that was invented after 22nd February 2014.
Nobody was making this argument before
22nd February 2014. Nobody was arguing that we had to
expand NATO to contain Russia before 22nd February 2012. What
happened on 22nd February 2014 is this cockamamie strategy that we
had invented to make Romania, uh
to make Ukraine a part of NATO , blew up in our face. And when it
blew
up in our face because of our
flawed policies, we were not going to
admit that we had screwed up – no, we had to blame the Russians.
So we said they were bent all along on dominating eastern Europe.
Of course, you hear the same argument
made today. ‘It’s the
Russians who are the bad guys: Putin is really dangerous. We can’t negotiate with him this: is the
equivalent of Munich’,
which is another way of saying he’s the second coming of Adolf
Hitler, and making a deal on Ukraine is like making the deal on
Czechoslovakia in October 1938. This is all pure, unadulterated nonsense,
right. Again, there
was no threat from Russia between
… before 22nd February 2014. Just wasn’t. We
invented that story. But anyway what the ideal situation would be
to create a neutral Ukraine, a Ukraine that looked a lot like the
Ukraine that existed between 91 and 2014. But we can’t do that,
and we can’t do that in large part because the
Americans are unwilling to make any sorts of concessions on
NATO expansion and, furthermore, to make neutrality work to make, to
create a neutral Ukraine. Uh
it’s very important that the Ukrainian government in Kiev reach some sort of
modus vivendi with
the Russian-speaking population in the Donbass – uh this is the
famous
Minsk accords, right. It’s imperative
that
the Kiev government implement the Minsk accords,
so that the civil war – and it
is effectively a civil war between the people in Donbass and
the people in western Ukraine – that has to be
settled before this problem can be solved. But the politics inside of Ukraine at
this point in time make that impossible. And again, as I said,
it’s impossible to envision President Biden
at this point saying that he’s going to give up on NATO
expansion. So the end result is this crisis is
going to go on and on. That’s the sad truth in my humble opinion.
So with that, I’ll stop talking, Tom, and turn it over to you.
[...]
55m15s-56m10s
The Russophobia in the West is – especially the
United States – is just off the charts. It’s
truly
remarkable how much Russophobia there is in the United States –
the hostility to Putin. It’s really mind-boggling. Um
my good friend Steve Cohen
– who’s now dead, who is a very prominent Sovietologist in his
day, an expert on Russia after the Soviet Union collapsed, Steve
was on the left politically – and he argued
that it was much easier
during the Cold War to make arguments that were sympathetic to
the Soviet Union than it is to make arguments that are
sympathetic to Russia in the contemporary political
environment. It’s a really remarkable statement.
[…]
Addendum (mine, not Prof. Mearsheimer’s)
With respect to Prof. Mearsheimer’s claim that
the West has been arming Ukraine’s army, well, here is an
instance of active military involvement almost semi-official
in form, it would seem. This according to an article I
stumbled upon as I was trying to retrieve information on a
memorial called ‘the Alley of Angels’ on a website focusing on
the Russian-speaking victims of the UAF in the war-affected
regions (now, republics) of Lugansk and Donetsk of Ukraine in
connection with another
post of mine. The article was published on 13th
September 2016, not this year.
https://www.stalkerzone.org/11-canadian-mercenaries-go-home-bodybags-master-class-donbass
Articles on the same subject by John J. Mearsheimer
‘Don’t Arm Ukraine’,
New York Times, 8
February 2015
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Dont-Arm-Ukraine-The-New-York-Times.pdf
‘Why the Ukraine
Crisis Is the West’s Fault’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 93 No. 5 (September/October 2014), pp.
1-12
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf
‘Getting Ukraine
Wrong’, New
York Times, 13 March 2014
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Getting-Ukraine-Wrong.pdf
Some public interventions of John J. Mearsheimer in
relation to the same subjects
‘American Scholars
Say The Real Threat To The U.S. Is Russophobia’, VICE News, HBO, 16
July 2018
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJBQikfYyKs
Ctrl + f Ukraine at
https://www.mearsheimer.com/public-appearances
Lausanne, the above was published on
the third day of the third month of
the year two thousand and twenty-two.